

Date: Tue, 12 Oct 2010 23:45:09 -0400

To: "Dr. Baruch Fischhoff - Chair, National Academy Committee on Improving Intelligence" <baruch@cmu.edu>

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**Subject: 168. Kosovo and Other Cases - Successes and Lessons? Third Party Diplomacy for Intelligence, Prevention, and Follow-Through?**

Dr. Fischhoff and Colleagues:

You might want to take a look at the Kosovo War and other (eventual) successes.<1>

The follow-through in Central America - for example the conflict in El Salvador, in which the Carter Center played a key role and in which emerging behavioral science theories of conflict resolution were involved, is another example of apparent success + lessons. At first, America's institutional capacity for economic/political forecasting and prevention failed miserably in the region [the Carter Administration; later, including the Iran-Contra breakdowns in the Reagan years.]. However the Kissinger Commission plans - that had strong inputs from behavioral scientists - and the Carter Center's follow-through may have been more connected to reality, with good intelligence and genuine and sustained learning.

**Who Can Gather the Necessary Intelligence? Third Party Diplomacy**

In an important set of cases, the intelligence that a US President needs may require very specific people to be involved. Traditionally: 1.) Ambassadors and the State Department professionals deal with a country's government officials; 2.) The CIA chief and his/her networks build links to the dissident and other groups. Against this traditional background, the Third Part Diplomacy movement - sustained contact groups of influential and well-connected people from a range of institutions who do not hold current government office - may be a very important innovation. Working full time, for example,

George Mitchell probably could learn a lot more about the conflict in Northern Ireland and avenues for progress than would be possible from studying computer screens and databases in Northern Virginia. Or than a CIA station chief or Ambassador could learn. And this could be another important lesson - from successes - that is true generally and has broader implications for the best balance of DNI investments across the full range of his responsibilities.

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<1> Prevention/deterrence initially failed. I do not know if US intelligence forecasts initially failed.

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