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To: "Dr. Baruch Fischhoff - Chair, National Academy Committee on Improving Intelligence" <baruch@cmu.edu>

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Subject: 168. Kosovo and Other Cases - Successes and Lessons? Third Party Diplomacy for Intelligence, Prevention, and Follow-Through?

Dr. Fischhoff and Colleagues:

You might want to take a look at the Kosovo War and other (eventual) successes.<1>

The follow-through in Central America - for example the conflict in El Salvador, in which the Carter Center played a key role and in which emerging behavioral science theories of conflict resolution were involved, is another example of apparent success + lessons. At first, America's institutional capacity for economic/political forecasting and prevention failed miserably in the region [the Carter Administration; later, including the Iran-Contra breakdowns in the Reagan years.]. However the Kissinger Commission plans - that had strong inputs from behavioral scientists - and the Carter Center's follow-through may have been more connected to reality, with good intelligence and genuine and sustained learning.

Who Can Gather the Necessary Intelligence? Third Party Diplomacy

In an important set of cases, the intelligence that a US President needs may require very specific people to be involved. Traditionally: 1.) Ambassadors and the State Department professionals deal with a country's government officials; 2.) The CIA chief and his/her networks build links to the dissident and other groups. Against this traditional background, the Third Part Diplomacy movement - sustained contact groups of influential and well-connected people from a range of institutions who do not hold current government office - may be a very important innovation. Working full time, for example,

George Mitchell probably could learn a lot more about the conflict in Northern Ireland and avenues for progress than would be possible from studying computer screens and databases in Northern Virginia. Or than a CIA station chief or Ambassador could learn. And this could be another important lesson - from successes - that is true generally and has broader implications for the best balance of DNI investments across the full range of his responsibilities.

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<1> Prevention/deterrence initially failed. I do not know if US intelligence forecasts initially failed.

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