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To: "Dr. Baruch Fischhoff - Chair, National Academy Committee on Improving Intelligence" <baruch@cmu.edu>, "Dr. Richard Atkinson" <rcatkinson@ucsd.edu>, "Dr. Kenneth Prewitt" <kp2058@columbia.edu>

From: Lloyd Etheredge <lloyd.etheredge@policyscience.net>

**Subject: 185. Update: Dallek's New Analysis & Lessons re System-Level Intelligence**

Dear Dr. Fischhoff and Colleagues:

Robert Dallek's The Lost Peace: Leadership in a Time of Horror and Hope, 1945-1953 (2010) uses newly-available material to give a more refined explanation of the origin of the Cold War. One of his major theoretical contributions - perhaps as alive and relevant today as it was in 1945-1953 - is that failures of intelligence, misperceptions, mistaken forecasts, and faulty judgments are not independent across nations. Historically, misperceptions and misjudgments by all leaders - Stalin, by North Korea, by China, by the US, and others - interacted and produced, in the period that Dallek studies, dangerous and costly outcomes for themselves and the world.

I interpret The Lost Peace to support the view, which I have urged earlier, that cumulative research programs concerning behavioral science and national intelligence are urgently needed across the G-20 system and beyond (the Islamic world, N. Korea, and others). A perfect US system will not, in itself, get the results that we want.

**The Korean War Example**

For example, before the Korean War, Stalin was favorable to the North Korean attack because he judged that American involvement would occur and bog-down America in an Asian war. The diversion of attention and resources would be favorable to his goals in Western Europe. But in fact the sudden North Korean invasion created such alarm that it fully militarized the US containment doctrine. The cost of the conventional, prolonged Korean war also led John Foster Dulles and Republicans to develop the "more bang for the buck" reliance upon nuclear weapons

and a new "massive retaliation" doctrine of threatening direct nuclear attack against Russia in response to Communist aggression anywhere. An isolated war on a remote Asian peninsula of little geopolitical significance fueled the nuclear arms race, global polarization, and paranoia.

Also, in these years, Chou En Lai (Zhou Enlai) had very disconnected ideas about how to convey credible, deterrent, threats to America. His diplomatic style, like never bluffing and quietly and firmly warning a small child that he will be punished, is characteristic of Chinese views of how to deal with lesser foreign powers in their region, but Chou En Lai did not understand the operation of the US government and how to get a message through. And, thus, China did have to cross the Yalu and pay a fierce cost, as did everyone, for Chou En Lai's misperceptions. North Korea miscalculated about the American response to its invasion and its anticipated victory, Etc.

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