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To: "Dr. Baruch Fischhoff - Chair, National Academy of Sciences panel on Improving Intelligence Analysis" <baruch@cmu.edu>

From: Lloyd Etheredge <lloyd.etheredge@yale.edu>

Subject: 3. Israeli comparisons; Forecasting the Behavior of Teenage Males: The Enemy Image on Steroids

Dear Dr. Fischhoff:

I suggest that your National Academy panel ask Dr. Atkinson for additional funds and travel to Israel to review the work of Israeli intelligence agencies and policy institutions to improve their government's intelligence analysis. It is possible that by now, facing daily threats across several decades, they have tested better analytic methods that will be valuable to recommend in your US report to Admiral Blair.

Also, it would be interesting to discover if a *Hubris* Syndrome theory explains repeated miscalculation in Israeli foreign policy.

- A brief suggestion re a new and unexpected forecasting challenge. Traditionally opponents are nation-state actors with central, top-down control of soldiers, whose principal psychology is obedience to national authority. An intelligence analyst has to imagine him/her-self being an Arab head of state. But a very different (post-*Realpolitik*) psychology has been arising across the broad arc of the Middle East as its teenage males - aroused and affected directly by media images of violence against Arabs - can be linked into networks by a wide range of free-lance charismatic leaders.

The Enemy Image on Steroids

Today, the "enemy image" syndrome - studied earlier by psychologists - may become a new, powerful, independent force. We can deepen this earlier work and observe, via the hold of such video games on teenage males worldwide, the countless hours of heroic adventure, skill,

entrapment and excitement of game play against arrogant and cold, omnipotent, high-tech, invading persecutors. The behavior is not just rational, it can be driven by testosterone levels that [if suggestive experimental evidence is correct] are driven downward by defeat and soar upward after victories in striking back, even if symbolic.

This is a very different intelligence/empathy challenge. I suspect that Israel's intelligence forecasts and strategies have become worse, beginning with the unexpected (first, 1987) *Intifada*. . . . This unanticipated change may also increase US failures in our youth-violence/Middle East peace process forecasts. Also, there are blunt policy implications that a CIA analyst should draw - for example, do *not* create *Realpolitik* fear and awe" images to these foreign youth audiences. . . . I enclose a brief outline of ideas about the key (potential) importance of this geopolitical shift in the psychology of violent actors for intelligence analysis (a brief memo for a World Academy of Art & Science project and footnote 3, p. 11 of the longer paper): The implication that I have drawn is to shift, quickly and strongly, to a political language of respect. This idea to upgrade US intelligence analysis has been circulating, with a boost from Washington, DC area political psychologists - and the jury is still out tho' we have a good naturally-occurring experiment embodied in Barack Obama's own natural instincts. But it is a potential meta-diagnosis via social science theory/research that you might want to know about.

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