

The Liberal Case:

Political Activism in a Hierarchical Drama

May, 1992
Draft

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The paper is divided into two sections. The first draws upon exploratory interviews, discussions and observations over several years to develop a new understanding of liberal activism. The second section contrasts this new model of liberal activism with 10 previous theories.

Overview

This new explanation uses recent innovations in the descriptive language of psychoanalytic theory to focus upon the system of imagination which joins the liberal activists' sense of themselves and their distinctive experience of a national political drama. A principal feature of liberal activism is diagrammed in Figure 1, an experience of the federal government primarily as a substantial presence located above their sense of themselves and above society as a whole. Further characterizing their sense of national drama is the endowment of the strong government image with a primarily benevolent power, whose full potential has not been realized.

In liberal activists a deficient sense of themselves, facing upward (and forward) exists beneath this higher reality. In this relation, the self feels deprived of, and in need of, qualities higher presences could provide - specifically needful of being recognized, loved, empathically mirrored, and uplifted by them (Kohut, 1971, 1977). The faith that affirmative government can do this because, as Hegel might appreciate, these unrealized potentials of an affirmative government reflect exactly the imagined needs of the people. The needy and the potential supplier are two "dialectical" halves, in the imagination, of a future whole. The liberal activist's

public quest expresses this understanding in an effort, through both magical and practical action, to empower fully and elicit the charismatic, loving, solicitous potentials of political leadership and affirmative government so its higher power connects to, nurtures, and inspirits the (lower) selves of all of us within its purview.

There are six major ways this imaginative system and the associational logic it contains within itself, become expressed in politics: preoccupation with political issues and actions located within a vertical mental space; underlying tendencies to feel alienated, despairing, deprived, and scared (associated with ideas about "downward" collapse into depression and catastrophic failure); the attributing of special powers to words, to intellectual formulations, and to dramatic gestures; a special faith in overarching, integrating, intellectual syntheses (including rational thought and socialist form) to serve the well-being of self and society; the fusion of aggression into altruistic and idealistic activity alongside self-blame; and hyperactivity.

THE LIBERAL ACTIVIST MODEL OF NATIONAL DRAMA

1. Construction of, and Preoccupation with, Well-Being Imagined Vertically

The liberal worldview imagines political systems as individuals and entities arrayed within hierarchies. Government is above us, here in America. Beneath it, the liberal looks outward and upward from his (or her) point of origin, a subjective sense of self vaguely, and sometimes slightly desperately, unfulfilled and needful of the benevolent power which the government presence is experienced to embody in

material form.¹

At a par with the liberal activists' sense of self, and even further below, are most of the rest of us, needful of rescue and vitalization. Poor people are a presence typically located lower along a vertical dimension: for varieties of activists, whales, dolphins, wolves, students, women, under-developed countries, children, blacks, or other "disadvantaged" minorities stand in the same imaginative (social and psychological) location.²

The agenda within this strongly dramatized sensibility is to secure beneficence from above for the welfare of those below. It is a project located within the system (by contrast, a radical sensibility would express the experience of the state as a higher presence with human qualities of aggressiveness, exploitative intent, and demeaning condescension. The logic of those inherent endowments would create a different agenda for the overthrow of Leviathan to create an entirely new benevolent order capable of affirming human dignity and well-being). The liberal project, by contrast, depends upon, and expresses the prior experience (created in the imagination) of essential goodness.

The political drama to realize progress involves both downward and upward movement. First, the effort is to make government more compassionate, generous, "better managed," solicitous, "closer to the people," and to improve "outreach" programs as it faces downward and outward toward those lower in society; second,

¹ A good introduction to formal techniques for 3-dimensional dramatic models is A. Paul Hare, Social Interaction as Drama: Applications from Conflict Resolution (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1985).

² The federal government is one example of an entity above the self: God, high status roles, or more competent ideal selves, or overarching theories - and so forth - seem to function in the same way.

an effort to use power from above to uplift those beneath to a place in the sun where they will feel respect, recognition, empowered, confirmed in the value of their existence. "Upward mobility" social prescriptions reflect faith in the blessings of upward movements, as those afflicted with depression, despair, and partly transparent existence become fulfilled through a social and economic transformation which is, at its core, essentially a transformation and rescue of morale and spirit.

2. Underlying Alienation, Despair, Fear of Catastrophe

The unhappy dependency of an unfulfilled self on higher presences is labeled and experienced as "alienation," an alienation the liberal activist does not experience solely as a passive victim but strives to overcome. To be topographically specific, when liberal activists say they feel alienated from "society," the internal referent is a vaguely defined presence above, around, and larger than the self and only partially concerned with it. The claim that the meaning of life is deficient, and partly absent, is the experience that the set of presences located above the self (labeled as ideas and beliefs) are inadequately charismatic, inadequately inspiring, inadequately uplifting.

Alienation and despair are often only underlying aspects and manifested only episodically. The liberal activist's drive is for reform, a self-therapy (and social improvement) project to secure control of higher power, activate it, make real the unrealized solicitude from above for the selves below which need "self actualization." It is a key faith of the project, sustained by its a priori hierarchical imagery, that alienation and despair can be overcome by evoking responses from above. "Unless we have a strong leader in the White House, American society is not going

to get much better" is a faith endorsed unanimously by liberal activist subjects I interviewed.

Underlying the discussion might be sensed a moderate amount of separation anxiety (Bowlby, 1977a; De Grazia, 1948; Etheredge, 1980a), a feeling some people get when they are lost on country roads without a road map: worry, frustration, despair, disorientation - as if they are apart from society and cannot get their bearings - a fear of coming apart, too, themselves. Liberal activists express this tendency to feel lost, despairing, and uncertain about their own identities within historical and social coordinates (see below, on intellectual quests) - even though, of course, they know full well where they, and other people, are located physically.

Some psychoanalytic theorists have maintained that it is love, responsiveness, and empathic mirroring from above and in front (given an infant by its mother), that establishes an early and easy sense of well-being and identity (Mazlish, 1979). The liberal activist seems to feel, analogously, that government presences imagined in the same location can - and should - and indeed must - perform the same identity creating, recognizing, and sustaining function for individuals and for our society.

Yet our government's capacity to let its face shine upon the people and give us peace is not yet realized, in the liberal activist experience of our national political drama. A feared loss of the potential to effect such rescue, and its present problematic character, makes the liberal fear catastrophe should government cease its efforts or be unable to cope: without a strong, bold, effective and charismatic government, liberal activists fear that the partially realized coherence of their identities, the components of their sense of self, (and our national identity) would disintegrate and lapse in despair. A response characteristic of liberal activists to the

question, "How would you feel if you stopped trying to make a better world?" is "I feel as though I would come apart."

3. Special Power Infused into Words, Thoughts, Symbols

Because liberal activists understand politics implicitly via a strong imaginative system, they seek to evoke and nurture the psychological and spiritual well-being of themselves, as well as of society, in dramatic, symbolic action, as well as by practical solutions (Edelman, 1964, 1977; Bruner, 1980). Of primary, and often exclusive, importance is that higher presences create symbolic statements of caring: "commitments," new programs (every year) that will spend large sums of money "doing something." The restless haste of liberal activists, with their sense of time claustrophobia and their desire that government always do more, has a driven quality. A displaced need to bring together and hold together elements of their own selves may compel manic-depressive patients in mental hospitals to save the world on a minor scale through such ritualized projects as hyperactive dusting and cleaning. In a similar way, liberal activists' projects are driven by a personal agenda that precedes thoughtful reflection about exactly how efficient or effective the objective outcome will be. The images in the mind create the hoped-for outcome as so implicitly realizable that thought goes no further.

Government is not the only higher image whose unrealized potential for blessing is the object of liberal activist projects. The hope for charismatic rescue extends to "higher status" individuals (in 1978 to the next Kennedy; then briefly to John Anderson), and it attaches to compellingly attractive, albeit vaguely defined, ideas of progress: these images (above and forward) are also attributed power to rescue the despairing self if only they can be brought fully to life and merged with

the people (i.e., semiotically, by going faster into the future).

Another manifestation of underlying despair is the attraction to novel ideas about well-being: the liberal activist may seize each new development with euphoric enthusiasm (the strength of the enthusiasm expressing the inner desperation of the need), as if this will provide our rescue (Downs, 1972). Science and technology can also be created as idealized images whose blessings then are sought. As the high hopes for each new Democratic President and the progressive liberal reforms in government budgeting - PPB, ZBB, MBO - are recent examples in political life, so too, in other areas of activists' lives, are jogging, health foods, gourmet cooking, transcendental meditation, est, new psychotherapies and consciousnesses, all of which are experienced hopefully as sources of excitement, rescue, surcease for the spirit, and fulfillment of the self's well-being. (For some of my subjects this includes, too, cycling through love affairs and marriages, with early idealization and excitement ever giving way to disillusionment.) Such activities may have practical benefits, but they are seized to ward off and deal self-therapeutically with impending catastrophe and demoralization that threaten to manifest themselves without continually new sources of hope and reassurance. Like churchgoers who need weekly reassurance of the reality of God's love, the liberal activist searches restlessly for new sources of hope within a hierarchical civil religion.

4. Special Attractions and Faith for Overarching, Empathically Mirroring, and Integrating Synthesis

Liberal activists also show energetic attraction to words and theories (Katan, 1940): they tend to talk and write a lot, and with distinctive purposes. The reason is that, in the liberal activist system, ideas, images, theories, and words are located

above the sense of the self; these too seem to have animistic qualities, so that liberal activists seek love, empathy, and an integrating solicitude from overarching symbolic formulations. They have a wish to be understood by theory, and to create theories which understand them. It is from such encoding (as well as practical considerations) that the liberal solution places a special faith in "upward mobility" social programs that promise to enhance well-being via greater knowledge and education.

The natural (psychological) extension of the liberal activist's political projects is socialism. For my subjects, socialism is not a matter of legal changes on a piece of paper but is truly a spiritual quest to create a coherent, empathic government presence above us all, caring about us, and personally connected with us. And so, too, the natural (psychological) extension of the liberal activist's hierarchical intellectuality is empathically accurate, compassionate, integrated intellectual formulations that care about us, empathically mirror us, and give us a perspective to recognize ourselves in context. The liberal activist considers such an achievement and such perspective to be the key to creating the control, confident and coherent identity, and perspective that we all need in our lives.

One of the further attractions of the socialist dream is that it refers in the imagination to a utopian society (self) that is organized coherently and integrated harmoniously. No claim for the virtue of "disorganized" social pluralism is ultimately convincing. Indeed, one way a liberal in Washington may define and recognize a problem and a need for government extension is prima facie by intellectual incoherence in areas of national life (the welfare system, fifty different state health systems). The inferential logic with the system is: "below and unorganized = demoralized." America can be pulled together, shaped up, and inspirited through federal leadership and organizing effort (and only by these).

One way the liberal solution via dramatic forms would organize things is through rational, synoptic government planning (albeit with "full participation" of at least those of lower status). Rationality is attractive because like socialism (to which it is a close psychological kin), it invokes in the imagination a sense of harmonious hierarchical integration as a "holding environment" for our lives that is an alternative to the only alternative - anxious, demoralized confusion.

The faith in such psychodramatic collective self-therapies can be expressed in attachment to social science or psychological theory as alternatives. My nonacademic subjects more often looked to the arts and humanities. These liberal activists had a special attraction to, and appreciation of, the unseen presence of (to them, charismatic) creative artists who had the power to discern, evoke, and give coherent expression to aspects of the self, thus bringing them to life. Such dependence on the arts and humanities fixed itself on creative sources with higher status than the self.

Another feature is also of interest. While my data base is small, it seems to me that even when liberal creative artists and social scientists described reality, they also sought to perform a reconstructive therapy, to name its constituent parts and formulate a perspective strategically so that they, the creators - and hence their readers - would have constructed a new and more viable sense of self outside and above existing circumstances. For example, liberal activists seem to express (and obtain) hope from describing and decrying the problems of society, an odd response if one thinks about it, as if to give voice to how everyday politics falls short of ideals was an identity-sorting and identity-reform process, an agenda in which the creator finds (or at least points to) a way out, rises above such problems, and subjectively constructs a more virtuous, autonomous, superior self.

One aspect of this identity-sorting process is that liberal activists can be somewhat hasty in their conclusions and projects - and defensive about them. They experience the liberal activist agenda as a commitment that should not encounter questioning by well-intentioned people. Given their experience of reality, it is difficult to be a good person and not be a liberal activist responsive to the sufferings of those below in the pecking orders. The drive for uplift and rescue via intellectual, identity, social, and economic reform is a quest for salvation. And there is a simple haste, not the potential realism about education = salvation theory found in Goethe's Faust.

5. Idealism, Guilt, and the Fate of Aggression

The sense of urgency to bring higher ideals fully to life also expresses idealistic intentions. Altruism is manifest in special solicitude for disadvantaged groups, in vicarious and empathic suffering on their behalf, and in identity transformation efforts, both practical and symbolic, to eliminate from life greed, selfishness, virulent hatred, callousness, repression, brutality, and other disharmonies arising from people's lack of mutual understanding. And it is manifest in their program to create idealized political (and artistic and intellectual) forms above us which are nurturant, rationally principled, beneficent.

Some part of this altruism, perhaps a substantial part, is probably due to the fact that some liberals tend to be nicer people than aggressive hardliners. The earlier research literature (see part two) suggests they have a moderate statistical tendency to be less defensive, more tolerant of diversity, are less fear-driven, less hostile, and perhaps more mentally healthy (Eckhardt, 1969; Eckhardt and Lentz, 1967; Dillehay, 1978; Eysenck, 1954; Etheredge, 1979 a,b).

Yet in two respects there is an inner story to be clarified. First, liberals have no internal compass about where, outside such symbolic politics, self interest lies: the partly unintegrated, partly despairing, partly diffuse sense of self (reflected in special concerns about identity, alienation, and the need for progress) also means they lack a solid center, a prerequisite for a sense of what they personally want to do.

Second, and more important, participants with this psychological involvement are inhibited from facing directly their dependent desires to be cared about, recognized, and inspired by the magic of benevolent government power, the charismatic rescue provided by idealized leaders, and empathic intellectual formulations. To think objectively would require a capacity to experience government as a separate object, to say "I want X from government." It is a direct grammatical structure disallowed by a strong entrapment and spiritual dependency. One cannot speak directly for oneself since to do so would require the depriving separation (between a subject and an object, separated by a verb) they are driven to eliminate altogether. Liberal activists' dependent complaining - and criticism - about non-ideal government's inadequate caring for others with whose deprivation they feel rapport is the closest they usually come to saying directly they want help, too.

Liberal protest against government inadequacy is thus more the ritualized complaining of unhappy dependence than the expression of direct anger and aggression. The diffuseness of aggression has other sources, too. Liberals do not experience themselves as selfish or brutal - in fact reject these elements of an identity. They are deeply opposed to hardline social policies or criminal penalties that create separation from disadvantaged groups: via empathy, these stand for resonant parts of themselves. To hold the poor, or criminals, in any way responsible for their own lives and actions - or to say anything is out of bounds in society

(other than direct aggression) is upsetting for the same reason. It wounds the sense of personal integrity, and it represents a step backward in the progressive agenda of harmonious integration. Another example of the same mechanism is that liberal activists may experience concern for more economic efficiency with humanistic horror, as callous, technocratic, and dehumanizing.

One fate of the aggression within this system is to be turned against the self, in the conviction that deficiencies in the self are responsible for the lack of fulfilling nurturance from above. ("If only I worked harder. . ."). Failures of personal upward mobility can engender self-blame. And, since they participate in their created experience of government so closely, liberal activists feel personal responsibility for, and a special guilt about, their government's inaction in the face of the world's problems (Klein, 1975; Segal, 1973).

There is one additional source of the quest for redemption through activism: the common elements linking liberal activists' needful and vulnerable sense of themselves with their images of the disadvantaged or victimized elicits, in addition to genuine compassion, an anticipatory self-defense motive. Liberals imagine themselves to be potential victims, as others have become victims. (For example, those in my sample who opposed fraternities in college did so in part from sensitivity to the feelings of those who might be excluded, in part from an inner uncertainty that they might not be chosen by a fraternity in such a system.)

The agenda to create a world in which one feels cared about is part of what leads those of my subjects who rejected capitalism (not all of them did so) to do so with passion: 1) in part because they consider people in business to be aggressive, selfish, brutal, hard-driving, and nasty - characteristics they reject and seek to overcome (in themselves, and in an improved common (human) identity) and wish

to eliminate from the world; 2) because the market system and large organizations treat people impersonally and makes them victims; and 3) they fear themselves vulnerable to be victims in a world run by predatory businessmen.

Aggression, however, has other fates than to be turned back against the self in liberal self-criticism and guilt to energize redemptive activism. While insisting they can act acceptably only from good and altruistic intentions (from a sense of self they feel worthy of being cared about), liberal activists can, and will, promote domestic reform crusades that do harm in the service of realizing ideals. This occurs naturally, in part, because liberal activists are very confident of their own good intentions (knowing them by direct personal experience) and thus judge the failure of other people in American society, at state and local levels and in business, to have created a humanitarian utopia already to mean they do not care enough: thus such people are assigned a flawed moral standing when protesting a growing federal role that restricts their freedom. In foreign policy debate, liberal activists have felt American foreign policy was (or at least should be) in the long-term interest of everyone else in the world. They are (or were) easily drawn to support leaders whose "save the world" reform projects involve pushing other people around - as long as the pushing is done in crusades to protect and defend the welfare of others (Blanchard, 1978; Etheredge, 1978).

Benevolent crusades (or New Frontiers) also produce (and include) de facto aggression against non-believers in other areas. For example, social scientists in my sample who believe that charismatic rescue by the empathic mirroring of "truth" requires strict scientific method, express a special fierceness (reacting against a sense of despair) about achieving high methodological standards. They are also intolerant of failures to provide confident overarching theoretical rescue from confusion. But other liberal social scientists think that statistical methodology is

cold, impersonal, and spiritually persecutes ("lower" status) students, and so they want to be solicitous of student welfare (and of the humanity of the people being studied) by reforming scientific method out of the curriculum.³

6. Hyperactivity

Liberal activists are, of course, activists. Politics engages energy from their central life agenda: a self-therapeutic quest, for self and society, to secure the blessings of ideals located in the imagination above the self. In the short run, too, the hyperactivity expresses an effort to transcend an underlying sense of boredom, to "ride over" underlying alienation and despair seeking to forget them in commitment (Gannett, 1979).

The activism of liberals is, however, somewhat episodic. If at times of activity they feel supremely confident of themselves and their projects, at other times they despair, as though perhaps nothing they do will work, everything will come apart, the future is hopeless.

It may have occurred to the reader to think of the liberal dramatic entrapment system as a normal form of what, when it becomes abnormal and all-consuming, is an alteration between mania and depression. There are striking surface similarities, as well as depth similarities, between the unsatisfactory relations to higher "benevolent" presences and psychoanalytic accounts (especially of "object relations" theorists) of intrapsychic structures and processes (Klein, 1975). Each system has a

³ I suspect, in literary criticism, the same fierceness is aroused against creative artists or colleagues whose work fails to realize harmonious, well-structured discernment and fulfilling empathic mirroring.

bipolar structure (appearing in the political form as hyperactivity and despair, rather than pathological mania and depressive collapse). The mania phase is characterized by an energized self-therapeutic preoccupation with words and (perhaps) by a desire to be understood, and achieve rescue, by symbolically integrative theory (i.e. formulated and expressed by a therapist) similar to the socialist quest (Katan, 1940). Beyond these two points, however, the diagnostic signs cited by various writers are too varied, and the diagnostic specificity of the psychiatric taxonomy too much in doubt, to allow a confident, point by point comparison to establish that the political dramatic sensibility is an intermediate imaginative structure between a clinically abnormal symptom entrapment and a fully integrated personal structure (Pope and Lipinski, 1978; Procci, 1976).

In the meantime, resemblances suggest a further lines of thought and investigation, the nature and occasion of the "switch" mechanism between liberal activism/idealism and liberal despair/disillusion (e.g., Gessing, 1975). In my sample, this "switch" mechanism seemed partly triggered by what the government, as a salient higher presence or "self-object" was doing (Wolf, 1976; Rickarby, 1977). That is, we probably have to read Lasswell (1930) backward as well as forward. Political (as opposed to apolitical) man is not only, as in Lasswell's conception, someone whose private motives are displaced onto public objects and rationalized as the public interest; a political man is someone for whom developments in the public domain also arouse and engage personal motives and emotional reactions (Magnusson and Endler, 1977).

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS: NEEDS FOR LOVE AND AUTONOMY

Among the remaining mysteries of liberal activists I do not yet understand

clearly, is how love integrates. Certainly the depressive substructure of unfulfilled dependency involves a lack of love and some uncomfortable sense of social isolation, a general characteristic of an underlying depression. The logic of progress (encoded within the dramatic form) tries both to achieve love from above and to pull together and bring fully to life unintegrated and depressed parts of him- (or her-) self through advocating a general solicitude toward groups whose lower imagined location resonates with underlying feelings of personal unfulfillment, and through intellectual/creative arts enterprises with a similar program. And the liberal is presently uncertain about feeling loved by government and national leaders (Lane, 1969). Love in this sense, however, has a special quality: the search for salvation by love from a hierarchy. Thus it may be helpful to speak with more differentiation about various qualities of love in political programs. The dramatic logic of altruism and love is too driven, too redemptive and compensatory in its original aim, for example, to be primarily a cherishing of individual uniqueness, too indiscriminating fully to know the people toward whom there is generalized goodwill.

The attachment to, and enthusiasm for, the idealized higher presences of their strong imaginative systems could be called a type of love, albeit interiorized. And my male subjects' image of the federal government had a kind of maternal quality, especially in what they want the government fully to be. (Female subjects were too few to risk a conjecture in their case.)

One additional observation: I have a sense that some inner core of the liberal activist remains obscure and eludes contact with others - is kept obscure, might be one way to say it. At a deeper level there seems to be a need for privacy and autonomy, a need not to be intruded upon or fully known, not to be engulfed or interfered with by others (Erikson, 1958; Kohut, 1971; Etheredge, 1976b).

Thus while at one level liberal activists may want socialism, at a deeper level they may be less sure, as though they desire a perfect union in which they are also independent. The association that crossed my mind, from another phase of my research, was a colleague's observation that scientists' view of ideal government policy toward science is contained two injunctions; "Give us money. Leave us alone." Like the child who wants simultaneously to be held and loved to be separate and free to play, the liberal agenda may have, at base, a dilemma more profound than I have been able fully to clarify. (Lichtenstein, 1977). I suspect that the desire to escape entrapment, to achieve autonomy, also makes itself felt in an aversion to discipline and to subordinate roles in hierarchies (liberal organizations seem never to be as well organized as conservative ones), in upward mobility as a desire to control and be free of control (see Sennett and Cobb, 1976), in the quest for intellectual perspective, and in ideological, methodological, and theoretical contentiousness to fight free of potential conceptual entrapment within someone else's perspective.

REFLECTIONS

A psychological study of liberal activists provides a larger perspective within which to be more inclusive, to see what is left out, or (being implicit) may need refinement. In Elms' (1977) terms, it offers the possibility of increased capacity for cognitive appraisals of social and political reality.

First, a political system, or the world as a whole, and surely the poor, could experience worse fates than to have policies significantly shaped by people with

liberal activist instincts and sensitivities. Liberal activists' commitment to doing good, their projects of organizing society and securing benevolence, and their drive for progress can obviously be beneficial in practical ways, and their symbolic and magical efforts to inspire national life and to acquire visionary, progressive leaders may be in touch with a need that is shared by many citizens. Since there are suffering people out there, their instincts are compassionate and hopeful guides. Their willingness, even eagerness, to adopt new and better solutions to social problems and their faith that we can secure the blessings of ideals, are a potential basis for genuine progress, just as their quickness to despair and to imagine impending catastrophe - e.g., ecological, energy resource, nuclear; loss of faith in progress - may be valuable early warnings. When they are not too rushed about saving the world to think, their special concerns with learning and creating self-reflective symbolic constructs that place themselves and modern life in perspective - and their willingness to be self-critical, to feel guilty about the inadequacies of their own efforts - may improve the cognitive aids to navigation in the changing world they help to create.

If we do live in a world in which the strong imaginative systems of liberals exist widely - and it is an open question - the liberal vision may also be an intelligent and powerful contribution to a viable civil religion, especially if (and when) it can be embodied in a matching reality. When religious people experience themselves in relationships with powerful presences above themselves, any disturbance of harmonious interaction with such presences is upsetting. To experience oneself as deeply known, loved, and cared for by God, the transcendent power in the universe, for all eternity, can be (literally) a great blessing, a source of confidence and serene well-being. So if a similar internal representation can be created and sustained in our lives via a government image (or by social science theories?), it too might be a great blessing to the psychological and spiritual well-being of a nation.

Yet, one of the unresolved empirical issues in the theory of mass psychology in America is precisely whether subjective subordinations exist widely; and one of the unresolved normative issues is whether policies that create and use such strong imagery encodings as the central psychology of their agenda are desirable. Both issues were recently exemplified in Burns' (1978) Leadership, a liberal activist theory that such an uplifting leader as Woodrow Wilson is a necessary ingredient to social and political transformation to realize our higher potentials. The book provides an implicit challenge to the theories of American psychotherapists (as reported in Sampson, 1977) who lead their patients only in a more modest sense, reject long-term dependency, and seek to promote personal growth through limited professional involvement, support individuation and autonomy, and eschew charismatic uplift and transcendent vision.

Yet there is intellectual haste within this hierarchical liberal drama and the problematic image encoding, the associations it engages, will be only first-order guides to implementing liberal values. There is unreflective hype for projects (in the activist phase) that may push too quickly, and with too little tolerance for critics, for new but chimerical sources of rescue. It is questionable whether federal bureaucracies can match the socialist dream without interfering oppressively in some aspects of national life (Gross, 1970). Even some liberal social scientists, having helped train a generation of rational managers, now have second thoughts about how it feels to be rationally managed by someone else (e.g., Wiesner, 1978). Moreover, the liberals' tenderminded view of other people (Eysenck, 1954) probably works best for policy design only for that subset of other people who are tenderminded (Etheredge, 1978, 1979a). Some nations, for example, may be unrealistically hostile because they need kindness and reassurance, just as some juvenile gang members may be criminals from a lack of love and meaning in their lives. Other nations may be run by ruthless, ambitious men; some delinquents may

have the time of their lives in callous in-group adventures of gang wars and macho adventure; and some muggers and pimps may not, deep in their hearts, be very nice people or - in the short-term - responsive to maternal solicitude.

[Section II - to Be Added]

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